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ABSTRACT
Over the years, communication networks have been shifting their focus from providing connectiv-
ity in a client/server model to providing a service or content. This shift has led to topic areas like
Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA), Heterogeneous Wireless Mesh Networks, and Ubiquitous
Computing. Furthermore, probably the broadest of these areas which embarks all is the Internet
of Things (IoT). The IoT is defined as an Internet where all physical entities (e.g., vehicles, ap-
pliances, smart phones, smart homes, computers, etc.), which we interact daily are connected and
exchanging data among themselves and users. The IoT has become a global goal for companies,
researchers, and users alike due to its different implementation and functional benefits: perfor-
mance efficiency, coverage, economic and health. Due to the variety of devices which connect to
it, it is expected that the IoT is composed of multiple technologies interacting together, to deliver
a service. This technologies interactions renders an important challenge that must be overcome:
how to communicate these technologies effectively and securely? The answer to this question is
vital for a successful deployment of IoT and achievement of all the potential benefits that the IoT
promises.
This thesis proposes a SOA approach at the Network Layer to be able to integrate all technologies
involved, in a transparent manner. The proposed set of solutions is composed of primarily the se-
cure implementation of a unifying routing algorithm and a layered messaging model to standardize
communication of all devices. Security is targeted to address the three main security concerns (i.e.,
confidentiality, integrity, and availability), with pervasive schemes that can be employed for any
kind of device on the client, backbone, and server side. The implementation of such schemes is
achieved by standard current security mechanisms (e.g., encryption), in combination with novel
context and intelligent checks that detect compromised devices. Moreover, a decentralized content
iii
processing design is presented. In such design, content processing is handled at the client side, al-
lowing server machines to serve more content, while being more reliable and capable of processing
complete security checks on data and client integrity.
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CHAPTER 1: IINTRODUCTION
Wireless technologies such as Wireless Sensor Networks (WSN), and Wireless Mesh Networks
(WMN), have acquired great importance and progress during the last years. It has now become
possible to deploy such networks to obtain data from an area, or provide internet access to mo-
bile end users [1]. With the creation of Wireless Metropolitan Area Networks technologies (i.e.
WiMAX and LTE), content distribution can be obtained even from long distances, in practically
real-time.
With these wide range of technologies, many domains such as Ubiquitous Computing and Urban
Sensing are able advance into providing content that was first not possible. Example of such con-
tent may include video, traffic updates, or precise route directions considering local information.
However, to achieve such goals, a unifying mechanism is needed with service provision as the
main goal. Such services can be provided, independently of connection type between nodes. To
accomplish such integration, the Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) has was proposed [2].
Services in SOA are loosely coupled. SOA is composed of 1) a service provider or producer (i.e.
server), to which clients subscribe and requests services from, 2) the service consumer (i.e. client),
and 3) a message independent of the service, which can carry the control information and content
of services. Traditionally SOA relies on web processing and XML messages, such as the Simple
Object Access Protocol (SOAP), which may not be available to all nodes.
This thesis targets integration at the network layer, and leaves the application layer to provide
a uniform interface using Single Page Applications (SPA) with REpresentational State Transfer
(REST) services. With such an integration we can exploit their individual advantages into a global
system which can be applied to multiple areas. An example of such area can be the Internet
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of Things (IoT), where content provision must be provided pervasively and securely. Failing to
address security as a design principle of services in heterogeneous networks will prevent efficient
reaction of network attacks. An occurrence of this could be seen on October 2016, where an
unknown entity attacked a large Domain Name Service provider in the US, using a large amount
of IoT devices to cause a Denial of Service attack. The enterprise was able to detect the presence
of a DDos early on, but immediate action was not possible in the current network architecture.
In order to complete the proposed integration, a unifying architecture and routing algorithm is pro-
posed, keeping security as part of its core design. In particular, we target the confidentiality of
the data and anonymity of endpoints. These requirements are achieved via a enhancement imple-
mentation of the routing algorithm proposed in [3], which we are denoting as ESORA (Enhanced
Service-Oriented Routing Algorithm).
We also target the integration of content services at the application layer, by providing a common
interface for all technologies. The interface would takes advantage of the advance computational
power that the network endpoints these days posses, to implement a thick client, which can maxi-
mize resilient content distribution using a transparent credential storage system.
The reminder of this thesis provides first some background on SORA and enhancements required
for adapting ESORA. Such enhancements, presented in Chapter 2, include the addition of new
routing metrics to achieve more resiliency and load balancing properties as well as a unifying ar-
chitecture. Following such introduction, we elaborate on the third layer of the model, known as
the technology layer. In such layer, all technologies integrate as one backbone via the Enhanced
Service-Oriented Routing Algorithm (ESORA) in Chapter 3. ESORA acts as a unifying routing
service, originally intended to provide SOA at the network layer, now focusing on content provi-
sion and routing resources properly. Afterwards, in Chapter 4, we introduce the front end located
at the final layer of the messaging model. Such front end delivers content uniformly using a thick
2
client approach known as Single Page Application (SPA). The front end uses SPA and enhances it
with security approaches to detect anomalies in user patterns distributed and defend the integrity
of the resources and client participants. Chapter 5 then closes the thesis with some final remarks
on the proposed systems.
3
CHAPTER 2: SERVICE-ORIENTED ARCHITECTURE AT
THE NETWORK LAYER
During recent years, there has been a common interest for integrating information processing into
everyday tasks, with the goal of achieving better quality of life for everyone. Such integration,
commonly referred to as the Internet of Things (IoT), requires a natural human-computer interac-
tion. Hence, traditional approaches may not be appropriate, because of the need of a transparent
device-to-device communication [4], which may include many types of network technologies.
To address the integration issue, a Versatile Service-Oriented Wireless Mesh Network (VESO-
Mesh) has been proposed [5]. VESO-Mesh integrates network communication with Signal Pro-
cessing tools, inside of its nodes, known as NETSIG (Networking + Signal Processing). VESO-
Mesh aims to provide optimal services, based on the principle of locality of service and heteroge-
neous wireless mesh networks, under a unifying architecture.
This chapter covers the proposed unifying architecture, which employs a layered approach to
provide content on Heterogeneous Wireless Mesh Networks (HWMN). At its core, the Service-
Oriented Routing Algorithm (SORA), originally presented in [3] and [6], is adopted with some
enhancements.
During the reminder of the chapter we elaborate on the design of the proposed unifying archi-
tecture, as means of establishing the required background to build up a secured Content Delivery
Network (CDN). But first we introduce the concepts of Heterogeneous Networks and Service-
Oriented Architecture as means to delivering pervasively the content. Afterwards, the latest ver-
sion of SORA is explained. SORA resides at the technology layer of the unifying architecture;
other layers of the architecture following SORA’s explanation. Lastly, we present the advantages
and disadvantages of SORA. Such disadvantages are later addressed in Chapter 3.
4
Heterogeneous Networks
This section presents the design and benefits of heterogeneous wireless mesh networks. The term
heterogeneous refers to different technologies [7], which may be determine according to processing
capabilities (e.g. Zigbee, WiFi, LTE/WiMAX, NETSIG [5], etc.). The idea of NETSIG arrives
from the evolution of telephone circuits. It started with mobile phones as part of the phone switch
network (0G), and then it moved to a separate but still analog network (1G). Afterwards, the
second generation of phones arrived (2G) with a digital scheme known as GSM. During the third
generation (3G), voice and data circuits where integrated into one, providing mobile users with
easy access to the Internet, pictures, message, phone calls, etc. Finally, the fourth generation (4G)
networks are now starting to rise, to provide high speed mobile access to all the 3G functionality,
and add real-time video on demand.
Following the principle, we now consider integrating communications with signal processing. The
approach can help monitoring and analysis of environmental events of interests (see Figure 2.1).
NET
SIG 
LINK
 
NETSIG Node
Wireless Router
Client
Environment Sensor
Area1 
Area 2 
Area 3
Figure 2.1: NETSIG Scenario
From home researchers may learn about species of interest, or possible events (e.g. earthquake). NETSIG allows to
receive concrete information from different areas, whereas without signal processing data would have no clear
meaning.
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Non-IP networks may communicate through the VESO-Mesh via subscriptions to multi-cast ad-
dress. For example, consider a Zigbee network (IEEE802.15.4) monitoring the temperature. Such
a network can extend its range with a bridging node (e.g. IEEE802.11n), which maps the multi-
cast address 239.7.15.83. Upon receiving a packet, the bridging node verifies if the destination
address is 239.7.15; if so, the content of its payload should contain embedded the structure of the
Zigbee packet.
Service-Oriented Architecture
Traditionally, the web backbone implementation is focused on providing efficient end-to-end con-
nection. On occasion, this leaves the user with the opportunity to select which specific server will
provide a request (i.e., mirror selection). This process many times leads to sub-optimal results, as
physically close connections may not be the best choice due to network topology factors. Some
factors that can contribute to this phenomenon can be the number of hops between source and des-
tination and the quality of the link between them. Although routing algorithms will find the best
connection between the source and destination, they will not explore other routes that provide the
same service as the request that comes from the client is to connect to the specific server.
The Service-Oriented Architecture (SOA) takes a different approach, by establishing context of
services and making the network able to choose better servers that can provide the same service.
Such context is established via endpoints, which can be described using the Web Services Denifin-
tion Language (WSDL). WSDLs describe the services, while the Simple Object Access Protocol
(SOAP) describes the communication commonly using XML via the Hypertext Transfer Prototo-
col (HTTP) or the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) services. SOA is being extensively used
in both academia [8] and enterprises such as Netflix.
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In [3] and [6], SOA was targeted at the network layer via a cross-layer routing algorithm with load
balancing effects, known as Service-Oriented Routing Algorithm (SORA). SORA gives advantage
of providing applications and devices access to use the benefits of SOA without the need of con-
necting to WSDLs. This thesis elaborates on the the original design of SORA to achieve the same
solution in a pervasive and secure environment, such that more coverage can be achieved for the
IoT.
SORA is enhanced throughout the rest of this thesis at the network layer and web service layer
(employing REST services with JSON), implementing security at each solution. In the following
sections we describe the latest version of SORA.
A Unifying Routing Algorithm: SORA
The original work of the Service-Oriented Routing Algorithm (SORA) was presented in [3] and
[6], upon which we extend its functionality to meet the security requirements. For completeness,
this section presents the essentials of SORA. SORA uses a DNS-like (Domain Name Service like)
approach to create a mapping of services to the IP Addresses of the servers which provide such
services. When a server wishes to join the network, it sends a control packet to its gateway telling
the services it can provide. A server may be seen as a host, or network, which provide a one or
more services. Then, the mesh network creates a service hash to keep a history of the services
available on the mesh. Such hash makes possible the integration of non TCP/UDP services (e.g.
sensor/actuator applications). For example, if initially a server provides FTP which is a traditional
service, the network assigns the traditional ports 20 and 21 for it, whereas non-traditional services
such as Temperature-Sensor may get assigned unused ports after 1024. This hash is broadcast to
the adjacent nodes, increasing the hop count by one, before sending. Broadcasting stops when the
receiving node learns no new routes, and the received message has a higher hop count than the one
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already stored for each of the routes. An example of the SORA’s original routing table can be seen
in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Classic Routing Table Example
Service Interface # Hops
25 172.16.2.1 2
21 172.16.3.1 2
21 172.16.3.1 4
25 172.20.1.1 2
8
Figure 2.2: Example of an FTP request
The client wishes to download a file through an FTP request. This client needs to request such a service to the mesh
(i.e., using its default gateway A). A then checks its routing table, finding that there is an FTP server 3 hops away
from it (i.e., atD). Hence, A sends the request through a session with B, where B does the same check that A did.
Then such request is transmitted to C and finally to D. At D the routing table specifies that the FTP server is
connected to D’s local network. At this moment the interface in the routing table is the IP Address of the server. To
answer the request, the server only needs to transmit back to the session hop’s source. The process is repeated at each
node until it reaches the client.
At the moment of a request, a client specifies to its gateway the service of interest (see Figure 2.2).
Afterwards the gateway verifies its routing table (see Table 2.1) and selects the server closest to
it. In case of error (e.g., resource is not provided by selected server), the gateway searches on the
alternative table for alternative servers. The alternative table is composed of the records on the
routing table which are not the closest route. If no additional server is found, the error message
is propagated back to the client. If the server provides the desired service, it sends it through the
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reverse path using the hop source of the received request (see Figure 2.3).
Figure 2.3: SORA’s packet structure
In SORA only the hop’s source address needs to be specified to return a request. For non IP networks, SORA creates
a map from a technology to a multicast IP address; encapsulating the content of the packet structure with smaller
maximum transmission unit inside of the data. The flow of the request to the server is decided upon the type and
service fields. A session number is kept for encrypting and decrypting the data. The last two fields are the length of
the data and the data itself.
SORA is ideal for service provision in heterogeneous networks, due of its flexibility with the
service historical marking and service abstract access. However, a network using such a scheme is
vulnerable to rogue servers and man-in-the-middle attacks. These issues are addressed in the next
chapter, with a description of the proposed techniques to enhance SORA, which will be referred
to as ESORA (Enhanced SORA). For the remainder of this chapter, we shall discuss the new non-
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security enhancements done to SORA to prepare it for ESORA, providing more reliability and
adaptive behavior. These modification includes addition of routing metrics and link cost, as well
as a unifying layered architecture to integrate different technologies.
Routing Metrics
In its original design, SORA only considered number of hops as routing metric to decide which
is the best route to a specific service. In preparation for ESORA, we have considered network
load and server reliability as metrics. Our ideal route should be closer in number of hops, with the
least amount of network load, and highest chance of finding the content of interest (i.e., highest
reliability).
Number of Hops
Ideally we want to minimize the number of hops, such that the request is handled faster (assuming
no overload is on the server), and the network congestion is kept to a minimum. The number of
hops is easily found upon service subscription, as the service broadcast hop count is incremented
by one by every mesh router before sending.
Network Load
Finding up the network load has to be done in an efficient manner, i.e., avoiding flooding of infor-
mation, as this process will be run continually. For such reason, we are limiting the network load
to local knowledge only. Nodes running SORA keep track of the each individual route load inside
the routing table. Every time a request is sent through a route, the load count is incremented; such
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counter is then decremented when a connection for the requested service is ended. The goal then
becomes picking a route with the smallest load count.
Server Reliability
Once more our interest is to obtain a reliable, yet simple to compute metric. Just as the Network
Load, the Server/Route Reliability is estimated locally as the percentage of requests that have been
successfully handled by the server (i.e., no error or unsupported conditions). Such metric is very
important because it allows us to use the best servers more often. However, this routing metric can
also be dangerous as it can ruin a server’s reputation with rouge clients asking for many unsatisfied
requests. In order for this metric to work, we have added two more tables to SORA.
One of these tables is the content table, where the outcome of a request is logged, such that a route
may get more or less importance for a given content. Such table is shown in Table 2.2, where a
value of 0 means a server does not have the content, 1 means the server has the content. In the
absence of a record in such table, meaning the server has never been asked for a specific content,
a value of 0.5 is used instead. The last request column serves to know if a server has already been
consulted recently for a resource, and in the case the outcome was a 1 it serves as a cache service
also.
Table 2.2: Server Successful Requests Example
Server Service Last Requests Outcome
172.16.3.1 21 profile.txt, contact.pag 1
172.16.3.5 80 index.html 1
172.16.3.5 21 favicon.ico 0
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The second table (Table 2.3) is the number of unsuccessful request per client; clients with a very
high value in such table are logged since they may indicate a malicious user. This table is reset
every certain time (1hour by default), such that blocked/logged clients can later retry to access
the mesh. In the example shown, client IP 172.16.3.115 will get block as a malicious user, as its
number of failed requests is too high and account for most of its requests outcomes.
Table 2.3: Clients Reputation Example
Client Fail Count Fail %
172.16.3.115 159 78
172.16.3.34 2 3
172.16.3.59 5 10
Cost Metric Function
Now that the routing metrics have been defined, we need to combine these in such a manner that
effective routing may be accomplish. A ranking function has been defined in terms of the number
of hops h, the depth of the network δ, load factor λ, and the server reliability ρ. After some testing
we arrived to Equation 2.1.
ρserver =


0.5 no request made∑
outcome
#requests
otherwise
λserver =
#pendingsservice∑
iǫservers#pendingsi,service
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∆ =
h
δ
Rank(route) =
ρ− λ
∆
(2.1)
This equation gives higher importance to servers with less requests pending and higher reliability.
The number of hops is used simply as a metric to boost those routes which are logically closer.
Furthermore, ranks with negative value reflect that the particular server is overloaded at the time
(load is higher than reliability) and the route at the moment should not be selected. Thus, the route
with the highest rank to handle the request is chosen as best. Alternatives are considered upon
failure of the primary route. An example of the resulting routing table, with the new metrics, is
shown in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4: New Routing Table Example
Service Interface # Hops # Pending Reliability Rank(realtime)
25 172.16.2.1 2 1 0.4 0.4
21 172.16.3.1 2 6 0.9 0.3
25 172.20.1.1 2 4 0.7 -0.2
Alternative Route Section
21 172.16.3.1 4 2 0.5 0.25
The next section discusses the unifying architecture which will later be used for the content distri-
bution system, part of ESORA, discussed in the next chapter.
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A Unifying Architecture
The following section introduces the VESO-Mesh architecture, which incorporates components
from Artificial Intelligence, Context-Awareness, Network Communication, and Green Energy Al-
ternatives to create networks that can provide content anywhere. VESO-Mesh follows and com-
bines the best practices from [9], [10], [11], [12], and [4], where the concepts of context, inference,
sensing, etc. were described. The proposed layered model is shown in Figure 2.4. The individual
layers are described in detailed in the following subsections, from bottom to top.
    1            2                3              4     5          6        User
Figure 2.4: VESO-Mesh Layered Model Architecture
From left (physical world) to right (user) the layers of the architecture are presented: 1) Environment Layer, 2)
Sensor Layer, 3) Technology Layer, 4) Service Layer, 5) Context Layer, and 6) Application Layer.
Environment Layer
As the first layer, the environment layer is composed of the physical world of interest. Such layer
contains enumerated the physical variables to be monitored (e.g. temperature, humidity, pressure,
illumination, etc.), which the VESO-Mesh must monitor and react accordingly. On this layer de-
signers should concentrate also on energy sources (traditional and green), emergency sources such
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as battery blocks, and any other device required to power such alternative sources (e.g. inverters).
A good design at the Environment Layer can help identify required components and increase the
range extend the reach a heterogeneous wireless mesh network, to reach virtually any terrain.
Sensor Layer
The sensor layer acts as input/output device to access the environment layer. The specifications of
such a layer should contain the number of sensors/actuators, along with their deployment config-
uration. Several factors such as: power consumption, maintainability, data rate, range, etc., must
be considered when designing the sensor layer of a VESO-Mesh network. Furthermore, sensors
and actuators may be further extend to any type of data acquisition device, including robots and
security cameras. Processing the information monitored by the sensor layer is task of the Service
Layer, which will be discussed in a moment. The interface defined to access the Sensor Layer is
shown in Figure 2.5.
16
enum Act ion {
READ,
WRITE,
UPDATE,
SUSPEND ,
RESUME
} ;
Ob j ec t r e a d i n g ( ) ;
boo l ean i sA c t u a t o r ( ) ;
Ob j ec t a c t i o n ( Act ion , Ob j ec t [ ] ) ;
S t r i n g t y p e ( ) ;
Figure 2.5: Sensor Layer Interface
Sensors may be defined by implementing the reading() interface. Actuators are a special type of sensor, which
implement the action() interface. Node status may be controlled through the action() interface, passing the
correspondingAction (e.g. READ senses,WRITE uses actuator functionality). A human readable description is
returned by the type() interface.
Technology Layer
The task of the technology layer consists in providing the VESO-Mesh access to all devices and
services (e.g., sensors, actuators, cameras, servers). Access should be transparent and with no
range limit, hence support for multiple technologies (e.g., WiFi, Bluetooth, WiMAX, LTE, etc.)
should be available. The different technologies should be bridged with the proper software and/or
hardware. In [10], it was studied the alternative of wireless mesh routers as a solution to this
problem. Wireless mesh routers are a good solution because it introduces very low infrastructure
changes. Integration may be possible with service orientation at the routing layer using SORA (or
ESORA once defined in the next chapter), which can be seen as analogous to the technology layer.
The interface used for the technology layer is shown in Figure 2.6.
Moreover, the technology layer makes appropriate to include cognitive capabilities, because bridge
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nodes may have the responsibility of scanning the spectrum and configuring the different available
technologies. Some of these mesh routers may be NETSIG nodes [5], containing signal processing
capabilities to analyze the environment or process the sensor layer information. Such capabilities
may be used for enhancing security concepts, such as privacy, and anonymity.
S t r i n g [ ] v e r i f y ( ) ;
boo l ean r e g i s t e r ( S t r i n g , S t r i n g ) ;
s u b s c r i b e ( S t r i n g , S t r i n g ) ;
Ob j ec t a c c e s s ( S t r i n g , S t r i n g , Ob j ec t [ ] ) ;
Figure 2.6: Technology Layer Interface
The VESO-Mesh returns the list of available services through the verify() interface. Servers and sensors may
register their services by calling the register() interface, while users may call subscribe() for update on services, or
access() for one time access, giving the name of the service of interest to access.
Service Layer
A service is an abstraction of at least one sensor and/or actuators of the sensor layer. A service
can also be a traditional service such FTP, in which case the flow goes to the traditional network
upon arriving at the endpoint. The service layer provides users with a collection of service that
can be performed by the network, without having to inform what type of technology is used for
such service. This gives the user the idea it is a single and easy to use technology. Such a list is
acquired by consulting the technology layer, via a call to the verify() interface. The service layer
also acts as a wrapper, providing users with human readable descriptions of the available services.
For example, the READ access of a temperature sensor would be Get Temperature, and in the
same manner a multi-media server would have Play Track, rather than WRITE which would be
its access on the sensor layer. In a manner of speaking, the service layer is like the drivers in
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an operating system. The mapping is hence created and maintained at the technology layer, with
elements of the sensor and service layers. The interface used for the service layer is shown in
Figure 2.7.
enum S t a t u s {
UNAVAILABLE,
IDLE ,
BUSY,
ERROR
} ;
S t r i n g name ( ) ;
S t a t u s s t a t u s ( ) ;
Ob j ec t c a l l ( S t r i n g , Ob j ec t [ ] ) ;
S t r i n g h e l p ( ) ;
Figure 2.7: Service Layer Interface
The status Enum returns the status of the services, which may be extracted from the technology layer. The name()
and status() interfaces provide information about the service, while the help interface provides a list of possible
commands for the service. For example, a thermostat could have Get — Set Temperature services, which would
translate at the technology layer to the correspondingREAD/WRITE for its actuator. The interface call() is used
to access the service itself, which internally will call the access() interface of the technology layer, to begin the
mapping.
Context Layer
In the context layer the information is filtered, according to the context in which the network is
in. A context is a group of activities associated to some factor. This activities could include social
networking concepts. For example, in the case of a smart home, each context is represented by
a user profile, in which for security reasons, children should not have access to appliances which
may cause accidents such as the range in the kitchen. Adults should have full rights, as long as
they are not intruders.
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This context establishment can be done by access to speech or image data coming from the ser-
vice layer. Thus, giving a high grade of selectivity through a natural interface. Other types of
algorithms, such as learning user patterns or preferences and suggesting services based on these
patterns/preferences are possible as well, due to the NETSIG capabilities.
The context layer hence, acts as a firewall to the application, where users will only view the func-
tionality available to them, and hide other functionality. Any schedule of frequent tasks should be
created and archived here. Just like the technology and service layer, the context layer also resides
in the mesh NETSIG nodes.
Application Layer
The application layer is the final layer is in charge of creating front end graphical user interfaces,
that facilitate the ease of network access. The applications are only able to see the content filtered
from the context layer; i.e. only operations that users are able to select should appear.
The application layer is the only layer which resides in the end-user devices, allowing for a trans-
parent integration with the TCP/IP technology stack. Chapter 4 provides a secure implementation
for a SORA web layer, which takes advantage of the distributed nature of the network and the load
balancing features of SORA.
SORA Security Needs
SORA when compared to other routing algorithms will find dynamically an optimal path from
client to service, while preserving its load balancing nature. Such a path may change as the en-
vironment and topology changes; thus, SORA provides a compact and adaptive solution for the
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IoT.
However, since SORA provides a SOA solution for delivering content at the network layer, the
topology can be vulnerable as no security at each node is being assumed. Chapter 3 addresses this
concern by implementing a novel and secure service discovery mechanism.
There are some solutions which currently exist for security at web services, such as CORS and
OAuth. These solutions will be adopted and extended by SORA in Chapter 4.
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CHAPTER 3: ENHANCING SORA WITH SECURITY
Over the past decades, wireless networks have been developed and deployed significantly, which
enables more and more applications. For each application, different requirements (i.e. data rate,
delay, storage, security, etc.) must be met. For such reason, researchers have dedicated to cre-
ate different technologies and standards that meet optimally these requirements. These standards
include: the IEEE802.11 (WiFi), the IEEE802.15 (including Bluetooth, Zigbee, and even Visual
Light Communication), and IEEE802.16 (WiMAX). Such standards have been of most importance
because of their low cost solutions and Wireless Mesh Networks (WMN) capabilities. WMN has
made possible the integration of information processing and communication into every-day tasks;
the deployment is easier and can have longer coverage range by using relay nodes.
AlthoughWMNs are appropriate for certain type of applications, such integration cannot be achieved
completely because the different technologies lack the capabilities to communicate among them-
selves. This communication is not possible because the traditional network architecture has fo-
cused on the connection of end points, rather than the service being provided. To address this
issue, a Service Oriented Architecture (SOA) was proposed. The SOA relies on message con-
tainers to request and provide services throughout the network. Messages are independent of the
service; services are loosely coupled to achieve higher re-usability. Service reuse makes SOA
an attractive solution for the domains of: context networks, location-aware networks, and ubiqui-
tous computing, which may lead to a different kind of solution called content-oriented networks.
Content-Oriented Networks (CON) give importance to service provision, as well as location and
context requirements.
In order for CON to be accepted as a valid solution, it must provide users with the necessary secu-
rity. Failure to meet the security requirements will prevent wireless heterogeneous networks from
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ever reaching its peak. Security primarily concerns with the following aspects: (1) confidentiality
to have only the requester and provider of a service access to the information, contained within the
message, (2) integrity so that service content does not change as it travels from one end of the path
to the other, (3) availability and (4) authentication to have services only accessible by legitimate
users whenever they need to.
In [7], SOA networks requirements were analyzed for WiMAX technology; proposing that in order
to have service orientation at the network layer which may leave to optimal content provision, a
service control framework and unified routing algorithm must be implemented. In Chapter 2, we
proposed a service control framework for Heterogeneous Wireless Mesh Networks, focusing on
content provision under the name of VESO-Mesh. VESO-Mesh strongly relies on the existence
of the unifying routing algorithm which has been designed with security being one of its primary
criteria.
Based on such design guidelines mentioned in [7], we developed a Service-Oriented Routing Algo-
rithm (SORA), also discussed in Chapter 2. In this chapter, we extend SORA for HWMN (Hetero-
geneous WMN) with three techniques to improve the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of
services [13]. First we adopt a key management scheme from Heterogeneous Wireless Sensor Net-
works (HWSN), then implement a novel technique which we call key shifting, and finally develop
node state-relations. The key management is used to provide encryption at the network layer, since
MAC layer encryption does not protect confidentiality over a multi-hop scenario. Once the keys
are distributed, the routing algorithm establishes secure sessions and enhances them by applying
key shifting to reduce the probability of an attacker learning the information. Finally, the enhanced
SORA (ESORA) uses the state-relations up trust among nodes, ensuring higher resilience, trust
and integrity, and service availability.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. First we introduce a distribution system to securely
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address the computational requirements for a heterogeneous network. The security enhancements
are then studied and explained. We then show the optimization problem of the key management
configuration, and the results obtained from it and the different security enhancements presented.
Finally, we conclude the chapter with some remarks.
Distribution System
In order to create effective routes for SORA, it is important to identify the provided content and
preserve their integrity [14]. However, to accomplish such goals, content may not stay on their
original locations, because some locations may not have high storage capacities (e.g. sensors), or
may be compromised, loosing its data to some attacker.
To solve this issue, we introduce VESO-DRS (VESO Distributed Resource System). VESO-DRS
is a distributed hash table approach (Figure 3.1). Such hash-table is composed of multiple keys,
which help to access data, verify integrity, and validate updates (sub-section 3). The resource table
may be accessed through an interface presented in sub-section 3.
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Master Sensor Node
ALIX Routers
Clients
Figure 3.1: VESO-DRS Architecture
Resources are distributed across the mesh, stored only by those nodes which have the capability. Nodes without such
capability, store their resources remotely. Resources may be queried unified, independently from location.
An additional indexing feature is added, to maintain privacy on sensitive information (sub-section
3). Sensitive information can be defined as: data of the resource which should only be accessed by
some specific destination only (e.g. medical records, e-bills, military communication, etc.). As last
component of VESO-DRS, a network wrapper is defined (sub-section 3), to transmit the VESO-
DRS request to the different nodes in the mesh. Such a wrapper utilizes a compact approach,
to be integrated in virtually any technology, and reduce the amount of information. In the next
sub-sections, we discuss in greater detail each component of VESO-DRS.
VESO-DRS Interface
This sub-section presents the set of functions which form the VESO-DRS interface. The VESO-
DRS interface is defined as follows:
1. Join(TableName, AllocSize) – used to join a node to the DRS specified by TableName.
After this call returns true the requesting node will notify its neighbors that it has AllocSize
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KB to store files locally.
2. Leave(TableName) – used to unsubscribe from the DRS. The content store must be passed
to the DRS, unless the owner is the requesting node.
3. Clear(Source <default=null>) – clears all table or only the entries from Source.
4. Remove(UpdateKey, ResourceName) – removes from the DRS the resource given by its
name. The UpdateKey is needed to ensure the user removing the DRS resource has rights to
remove such resource.
5. Put(ResourceName, Type, Content) – adds to the DRS the content of the new resource;
the resource file is inserted on the most appropriate node. This function returns false if the
resource cannot be added, which is the case when the resource needs to be updated, otherwise
True is returned.
6. Update(UpdateKey, ResourceName, Content) – updates the content of the ResourceName
and UpdateKey specified; the update key serves to distinguish different resources with the
same name, and validate authenticity of the update.
7. Get(ResourceName) – gets the resource from the DRS.
8. Size() – returns the number of KB stored in the node queried, the size is rounded to the
nearest KB.
9. Free() – returns the number of KB free.
10. Contains(ResourceName) – checks if the system has a resource with the specified name.
11. Share(ResourceName) – asks the owner of the ResourceName to share its edit key with the
requester.
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The next sub-section describes the VERSO-DRS hash-table; such hash-table is used to query con-
tent from the mesh.
VESO-DRS Hashtable
To achieve complete functionality of the VESO-DRS, that is, resource integrity and easy access,
VESO-DRS utilizes a hash table approach, in contrast to a file system approach while keeping the
integrity of resources[15]. The structure of such table is shown in table 3.1. The value of the key
K1 is used as the main primary key of the table. To obtain K1, the resource name is hashed using
a hash function such as the MD5.
Table 3.1: VESO-DRS Indexing Table
K1 K2 K3 Resource Content
Hashed Resource Name Hashed Content Update Validation or Source Id
md5 md5 long bytes
The other two keys, K2 and K3, are used for preserving the integrity of the resource as a digital
signature [16]. The value of K2 is obtained as a hashed function of the content. When an attacker
compromises a node or changes a resource, it needs to change correctly K2, failing to do so will
result in a detection of the corrupted resource [17], and the resource will be blocked to end users.
Furthermore, any user or attacker who desires to make a valid update needs to know the value of
K3, which is a large integer randomly generated when the resource is added to the mesh.
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Secure Indexing
There are times where data in a network must be kept private and viewable only to their destinations
[18]. Failing to do so may result in learning about sensitive information such as medical records,
military strategies,etc. Simple encryption however, provides the necessary privacy [19, 20], but
makes it practically impossible to search the data within the network. This section discusses a
scheme for storing encrypted data, and searching it to recover it.
Protecting and Recovering Information
To protect the data, the interface of VESO-DRS is enhanced with two additional functions, such
functions allow the owner of a content to protect the data with a newly generated update key. The
prototype for the two additional functions is defined as:
• Protect(ResourceName, UpdateKey, AlgoName) – Protects the resource ResourceName
by encrypting it using UpdateKey as key for the algorithm named AlgoName. AlgoName
may be any encryption algorithm supported by the mesh (e.g. 3-DES, AES, RSA, etc.). At
the end, the function returns a newly generated updated key, which replaces the specified by
the original put.
• ProPut(ResourceName, Type, Content, AlgoName) – adds to the DRS the content of the
new resource; the resource file is inserted on the most appropriate node, and encrypted using
the randomly generated update key and the specified algorithm. This function returns 0 if
the resource cannot be added, or the update key otherwise.
When a get request is performed, data is returned to the requested encrypted by the selected algo-
rithm and update key. Only users with knowledge of the algorithm and update key may access the
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information inside of the resource. If no such right exists, then requester may first ask to the owner
to share its encryption parameters, using the mechanism described in later in 3.
Searching Information
Resources may contain encrypted or non encrypted information. To obtain the relevance of a
resource with respect to the search of interest, the mesh needs to create the set Wˆ which is an
encrypted search if the resource is encrypted, or plain-text if no encryption is used. The elements
in Wˆ are the words in the search, encrypted as needed; each resource is then ranked according to
Algorithm 1.
Line 2 of the algorithm states that for each search with keywords K, the first step is to transform
all words into their stem form (i.e. singular, present tense, etc.), and remove the words which
do not contribute to the search. Afterwards, the new keywords are stored in Wˆ , and encrypted if
necessary (line 3). In the next step (line 8), the algorithm creates a subset of matchesM , which is
created from the keywords that are found on each sentence.
Following this step, the algorithm computes a factor ι at lines 10–13, which is to give higher rank-
ing to resources with keywords of greater importance. That is, users are most likely to specify
as first keywords, the keywords that they find more relevant. For example, in the search ’blue-
tooth and zigbee wireless technologies’, the user would most likely want to find information about
bluetooth and zigbee, and not care much about the WiFi technology.
Then, the algorithm proceeds to find the distance between two adjacent keywords δ inM on lines
14–27. After all sentences are analyzed, the resource is ranked according to the expression in line
18, where the factor
|M | − 1
|Wˆ | − 1
serves as a penalty factor for those sentences which do not contain
all the keywords. That is, if all the keywords are found in the sentence, then the factor becomes
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1, and the sentence contribution just depends upon the distance between keywords (the closer the
better contribution), and the importance of the keywords (most relevant in context should be as
first keywords).
Algorithm 1 Resource Ranking Algorithm
1: Start with some user specified keywordsK
2: Wˆ ← K in its stem form, without non informative words (e.g. conjunctions, prepositions
articles, etc.)
3: if Resource Encrypted then
3: Encrypt(Wˆ )
4: end if
5: for Each Resource R do
6: RankR ← 0
7: for Each Sentence S do
8: Find matchM ⊂ Wˆ in S
9: if M is not null then
10: ι← 1
11: for Each keyword inM do
12: ι← ι · (|Wˆ | − indexofin(Mj , Wˆ ))
13: end for
14: δ ← 0
15: for Each pair of consecutive words inM do
16: δ ← δ +
1
|indexof(Mj)− indexof(Mj+1)|
17: end for
18: RankR ← RankR + ι · δ ·
|M |
|Wˆ |
19: end if
20: end for
21: end for
22: Sort resources in descending order with respect to RankR
Since sensitive information should be encrypted by the owner, the mesh needs to share limited
information of these resources, such that authorized non-owners may obtain the resources. In the
following sub-section we present the process on information sharing, by enhancing the interface
previously described.
30
Sharing Information
As seen in the interface at sub-section 3, any user who wishes to get rights over a resource, may
ask the owner for its update key. If data is encrypted, then users may also ask for the update key,
when recovering some information not added by them. Hence, if the resource is encrypted, sharing
requires that the owner gives the update key and encryption algorithm.
To protect this information, the network wrapper (sub-section 3) sends the request for the hashed
resource name and a request id, the owner then checks its resources by hashing their name first and
comparing against the requested resource name. Upon approval, the owner sends back the id that
it received such that the requester may know to which resource it belongs, followed by the update
key and encryption algorithm.
Network Wrapper
A network wrapper is needed to transfer the VESO-DRS requests across the mesh. Such a wrapper
is shown in figure 3.2. The data of the request (e.g. resource name, update key, content, etc.) needs
to be serialized into an array of bytes, before being inserted into the parameters field. Since most
of the parameters are hash values, the wrapper’s implementation knows a priory most of its length.
For example, if an MD5 algorithm is used, the wrapper will know that the resource names will
be fixed to 16 bytes; moreover, the update key and the hashed content for preserving integrity, are
always of the same length as well. Hence, by subtracting the value of parameter length minus these
fixed size parameters, the wrapper can find out the byte length of the content. This approach makes
the wrapper compact enough, to be supported by many wireless technologies (e.g. wifi, bluetooth,
zigbee).
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FUNCTION ID
PARAMETERS
LENGTH
CONTENT
Figure 3.2: Wrapper Structure
A Function ID may take 1 byte, to identify which of the 10 functions of the interface is being accessed. Additionaly,
two ID’s are added for the REPLY from server, and CONTROL of the hashtable flooding. Moreover, only the data is
needed, which is the only variable length field; its length is specified by the 2 bytes of parameters length.
In the following section, we describe the different security features which ESORA implements at
the network topology.
Security at the Topology
A secure service-oriented network should posses at least 4 requirements [21]: acceptable delay,
session keys, perfect forward secrecy, and anonymity. From [7], the control framework and unified
routing algorithm can be added to these requirements. To achieve such requirements, ESORA
adapts the following enhancements. First the algorithm employs a key management scheme to
assign the keys accordingly to each node (sub-section 3). Then, these keys are used to create
secure hop by hop sessions that allow confidentiality throughout the path (sub-section 3). The next
step is to maintain periodic relationships among the nodes to monitor each other for detecting any
compromised node (sub-section 3). The next subsections will discuss in detail how these three
approaches are designed.
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Key Management
There are many schemes for solving the key management problem, which could be considered
when designing an HWMN. In this work, we adopt the scheme in [22], where Heterogeneous
Wireless Sensor Networks (HWSN) consisting of 2 types of nodes was considered. We want to
experiment how the concepts of heterogeneity in sensor networks can be adapted to mesh networks.
In such approach, there are different classes of nodes ranging from 0 to N ; the scheme states that
classes with lower number have higher processing power, communication range, and storage space.
Hence, class 0 is the most powerful, and as the number increases, the capabilities of nodes decrease.
Each node stores Kc keys, where Kc is the number of keys in class c, from a key-pool of size S.
These keys are pre-loaded into the nodes randomly without replacement, such that the Kc keys in
one node are all different.
Nodes are able to communicate if at least they share Kmin (i.e. Kshared ≥ Kmin) keys with their
adjacent nodes, whereKshared is the number of keys shared by a node and its neighbors, andKmin
is the minimal number of shared keys required between two nodes to communicate. The original
work provides the entire mathematical model for the 2 class connection problem. Hence, here
we define the probability of connectivity for a class 0 node connecting with a class c node. Such
probability can be interpreted as the probability of having a secure bridge between technologies,
and it can be defined as
pconnectivity = p(Kshared ≥ Kmin) = 1−
Kmin−1∑
i=0
pshare[n](i) (3.1)
where pshare[n] can be defined as the probability that a class 0 node shares i different keys with the
other n neighbors. The value of pshare[n] can be calculated from equations 3.2. The conditional
probability h(i− j|j) states the probability of a node sharing an additional (i− j) different keys,
given that it already shares j different keys. Each node stores Kc keys from the total S available
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keys; the subscript c denotes the class number to which the node belongs (e.g. K0 is the number
of keys in class 0 nodes). The class number ranges from 0 to N , with N being the number of
available technologies.
pshare[n](i) =
∑i
j=0 pshare[n−1](i)h(i− j|j), for n > 1
pshare[1](i) =
(
S
i
)(
S−i
K0−i
)∏N
m=1
(
S−
∑N
h=1,h6=m Kh
Km−i
)
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m=0
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S
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)
h(i− j|j) =
(
S−j
i−j
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S−i
K0−i
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(3.2)
Note that if Kmin is increased, it becomes harder for unauthorized users to have access to the
network; however, the connectivity drops creating a trade-off that needs to be considered when de-
signing the network. To improve this scenario, designers can add more nodes to the neighborhood,
or increase the storage capacity of existing ones so that more keys can be stored. But under these
circumstances, the cost of the network increases as well, along with a decrease in security because
there are more nodes that can be compromised.
To adopt such a scheme, class 0 nodes are defined as the bridging nodes (i.e. nodes that have
the capability to communicate all technologies). Class 0 nodes are the most powerful in terms
of communication range, processing, and storage capabilities. Following class 0, there are N
technologies. Class t (1 ≤ t ≤ N) can only communicate with nodes in the same technology t, or
with a class 0 node. This assumption transforms our problem into the same 2 class problem seen
in [22]; thus the same analysis is valid. Hence, the heterogeneity on an HWMN as proposed here
is given by the technology types.
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Depending on the importance of each factor, the network designer may neglect some of the trade-
offs. Based on the configuration, the key-pool is selected and from it, the randomly chosen keys to
be assigned at each node. The next section discusses how ESORA exploits the benefit of such key
management scheme.
Key Shifting
ESORA encrypts information hop by hop throughout the network. To guarantee a secure path,
ESORA utilizes a simple session handshake (see figure 3.3) per hop to obtain a common key for
encryption. Such keys are previously distributed to each node as presented in sub-section 3. Thus,
for each hop and session, a key is used as argument of the encryption algorithm.
Figure 3.3: Simple Handshake, Session Key Establishment
When a source A wants to establish a session with an adjacent destination B, it sends a SESSION INIT . B sends
a pre-defined message encrypted with one of its keysKǫKB. A tries to decrypt the message using the keys stored in
KA. Upon success (i.e. KǫKA ∩KB) A sends a challenge response to B. Such a response is another pre-defined
message encrypted with the key that A found. If the key that A chose is the same as B, B decodes the challenge
response and sends the acknowledgment to A to begin the request.
Additional security is provided using a novel technique which we define as key shifting. Key
shifting involves using an additional parameter to shift the session key Ks. Such a parameter is
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conveniently chosen as the number of hops to reach the destination server. Thus, the probability
of an attacker finding the content of a message is given by equation 3.3, where δ is the depth of
the mesh. For example, to find the selected key Ksel = Ks + h the attacker needs to find out Ks
(from session table) and h (from routing table). To illustrate the benefits of key shifting, even an
algorithm with a probability of finding a key of 0.5, can be reduced by a factor for 0.33 (i.e. 0.167)
with a small mesh of at most 3 hops. When receiving a response, nodes can decode the content
using the session id to find out the required parameters.
pdecode =
palgorithm
δ
(3.3)
Table 3.2: Example of Session Table
Session Id Session Key Service Client Route Id
(8*A + 4*B + 2*C + D) Session Id(128bits) (A.B.C.D)
1447 3050 21 172.16.3.1 0 (Primary)
1448 3050 21 172.16.3.1 1 (Alternative table)
To implement encryption in ESORA, XTEA has been chosen. XTEA is a block extension of the
Tiny Encryption Algorithm (TEA) demonstrated first in [23]. XTEA has a simple implementation
and quick performance, allowing it to be implemented even in hardware. The suggested number
of rounds for XTEA (i.e. 64) has been selected.
Table 3.2 presents an example of a session structure. The first column represents the mapping of
the source hop, which is inserted into the packet to recover the client’s identity later. If a created
session id is already assigned, it is then increased by 1. Once the id is generated, it is inserted into
the packet for answering the request later.
Additionally, to prevent timing attacks which have proven to be strong enough even against AES
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[24], an extra random delay was added at the end of encryption. Hence any time relationship
between two frames would have also included an additional phase shift ofKsel+rand, whereKsel
is the selected key.
For adapting such a scheme, ESORA has two additional packet types: SESSION START and
SESSION INV ALID. SESSION START is sent by any kind of source node A that wishes
to transmit a packet to a destination B. The moment a SESSION START is received, the
receiving node begins the security challenge as seen in figure 3.3. If the challenge is complete,
bothA andB will have created successfully a new session. If a session expires or is not completed,
nodes are notified with the SESSION INV ALID packet type. The next section discusses the
usage of node state-relations to increase the resilience, such that the HWMN is not lost if one node
is compromised.
Node State Relations
ESORA creates node state-relations in order to monitor the nodes on the mesh frequently. Nodes
form families, similar to the work presented in [25], with the difference that families are kept to a
fixed size (i.e. up to 4 nodes), and the addition of a sleep policy. Moreover, nodes agree to follow
some policies that allow each other to keep track of their well-being (i.e. non compromised state,
low power, admin maintenance, etc.). The types of policies in ESORA are:
1. Initial: When new nodes are being authenticated on the network, they must associate to
another node. Initially such a node doesn’t exist, so the first node should pair temporarily
with its default gateway. Once an extra node is added, the first couple is created. Subsequent
nodes will become a child of such a couple, and later on get married to another node.
2. Marriage: Families of nodes are, at most composed, of three nodes. Such policy allows
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easier management of the network, while avoiding flooding the network with monitor pack-
ages and reducing power consumption. To achieve this behavior, a family is broken when it
reaches its fourth member, i.e. the newly added node will pair with the child of the selected
family. After marriage, the child has two relationships to maintain, with at most 4 relatives
(parents, couple, and child) to inform.
3. Periodic: Periodical updates are sent by each node to their relatives, to let know they
are operating under normal conditions. Such updates are possible with Rijndel’s algorithm,
where the key scheduling allows the nodes know what value to expect from their relatives.
If a member of the family fails to send such a message properly, the rest of the relatives will
know that it has been compromised. Afterwards they can make the proper arrangements to
notify the gateway of the event.
4. Sleep: At some point during their lifetime, nodes may decide to sleep. Such nodes can
do so, only by continuing to monitoring their relatives, so that existent families are kept. A
node must notify its relatives before going to sleep as part of the policy; the relatives will
then agree on what to expect from the node if it decides to wake up. A node may decide to
sleep if it is running low on power, or needs to be updated by an administrator. A node wakes
up in the event that it needs a service from the mesh, or one of its relatives is compromised
(i.e. periodic policy violation).
Optimal Key Distribution With PSO
The Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) algorithm [26] has been chosen to find the best parame-
ters, such that both connectivity and security are balanced. The PSO is ideal for such a task, due
to its properties of moving the particles in a population (i.e. the parameters). A Java implemen-
tation of the PSO was implemented; PSO is a generational evolutionary algorithm which updates
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each particle in a population, according to their position (equation 3.4) and velocity (equation 3.5),
where pid indicates the particle current best value, and pgbestid denotes the best value among all
particles. The value of xid is the current particle (i.e. possible solution), and ω is the velocity’s
inertia weight, which decreases linearly from a maximum value (to explore search space), to a
minimum value (to refine search).
xid ← xid + vid (3.4)
vid ← ω · vid + c1 · rand1 · (pid − xid) + c2 · rand2 · (pgbestid − xid) (3.5)
The search space for the problem has 2·(N+1) dimensions; the 1 of the expression comes from the
key-pool size parameter and N is for each pair of number of nodes in a class and their respective
stored keys. The term N + 1 is multiplied by 2 to have the effect of Kmin and Ki’s parameters.
Thus, the objective function for the be PSO can be expressed as equation 3.6, where the goal is to
maximize the connectivity, while still having the highestKmin possible.
argmax(Sx,Kminx,Nix,Kix){Pconn(Sx, Kminx, Nix, Kix)} (3.6)
In order to keep parameters in a practical range, minimum and maximum thresholds were set. That
is, the key pool size was kept Sx ≤ Smax, where Smax is the maximum key-pool size. In the
same manner, the minimum keys required are kept 0 ≤ Kminx ≤ Kmint, where Kmint is a fixed
threshold. Finally the number of nodes per class (Nix) and the number of keys inside them (Kix)
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are set such that equations 3.7 and 3.8 are satisfied, since higher class nodes have less capabilities.
Ni ≤ Ni+1; i ≥ 0 (3.7)
Ki ≥ Ki+1; i ≥ 0 (3.8)
Experimental Results AND Discussion
Resource Identification
This section presents the results obtained for the VESO-DRS system. Figure 3.4 denotes the
process of write (put) and read (get) of the VESO-DRS. Through the interface data is access as if it
were on local disk. That is, using service orientation, the user does not need to know about where
the data is stored. In figure, storing a file on the table requires only to give the path of the file to be
stored (i.e. content), and its name. Analogous, non-IP services such as a temperature sensor, may
store its readings into a server to be analyzed, or when performing a get with the local coordinates,
a near by temperature sensor may then provide the local temperature.
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r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t # v e s od r s pu t f i l e 1 . t x t
8625908641087029248
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t #
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t # v e s od r s g e t f i l e 1 . t x t
At : 1 0 . 4 3 . 4 2 . 2 / f i l e 1 . t x t
Con t en t : He l l o World !
Figure 3.4: Example of Data Access
Data may be accessed from the network, as if it were stored locally on the machine, using the command line interface.
In figure 3.5, the process of detecting corrupted resources is shown. Since the update key is un-
known, a compromised resource will have an invalid modification, and an violation in the check-
sum will be detected. At detection the mesh can stop the propagation of the resource to adjacent
nodes; hence, preventing an attack to the network and possible compromise (e.g. botnet), indepen-
dently of the technology type of the adjacent nodes. Further action on the compromised resource
may be taken, such as deletion of the resource or move the resource to quarantine.
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r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t # v e s od r s g e t f i l e 1 . t x t
At : 1 0 . 4 3 . 4 2 . 2 / f i l e 1 . t x t
Con t en t : He l l o World !
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t #
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t # v e s od r s g e t f i l e 1 . t x t
At : 1 0 . 4 3 . 4 2 . 2 / f i l e 1 . t x t
E r r o r : Data has been compromised .
Check : a7c286cc198b7 fb1c71cc0 fcddb f807a
SCheck : b7886c8984a28557265d16b7ed16b87b
Figure 3.5: Example of Detection of Integrity
Invalid updates due to non-authorized modifications are detected with the checksum difference.
Moreover, the correct process for updating a resource is presented in figure 3.6. There are three
components that must be available to finish the update: the resource name which will be hashed,
the update key which is only known to users who are authorized to modify the resource, and the
new content. A malicious user does not know the update key, and hence it cannot make a proper
update, which in term will be detected as seen previously in figure 3.5.
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r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t # v e s od r s upda t e f i l e 1 . t x t 12345
” Th i s i s on ly a t e s t . F i l e upda t ed . ”
E r r o r : I n v a l i d upda t e key
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t #
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t # v e s od r s upda t e f i l e 1 . t x t
8625908641087029248 ” Th i s i s on ly a t e s t .
F i l e upda t ed . ”
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t #
r o o t@ l o c a l h o s t # v e s od r s g e t f i l e 1 . t x t
At : 1 0 . 4 3 . 4 2 . 2 / f i l e 1 . t x t
Con t en t : Th i s i s on ly a t e s t . F i l e upda t ed .
Figure 3.6: Example of Resource Update
Valid updates are performed through the interface, by providing the proper update key as well.
In table 3.3, we present the ranking results for the phrase ’bluetooth and zigbee wireless technolo-
gies’, in 4 resources. Results suggest that the scheme is able to give a good idea of each resource
relevance to the search, since the second resource ranked the highest, and the last resource ranked
the lowest. Scaling the results to a complete document would be a matter of adding each individual
sentence. For example, if we consider a resource having the first 3 phrases in table 3.3, the total
ranking for that resource would be 1.5 + 11.11 + 1 = 13.61.
Table 3.3: Ranking for ’bluetooth and zigbee wireless technologies’
Content Ranking
Bluetooth provides higher throughput than zigbee 1.5
Bluetooth and zigbee are examples of small area wireless technologies 11.11
Wireless technologies have evolved to cover larger area 1
Technology advances have improved the cinema community 0.25
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Security
During the first part of the experiment, we were interested to see how a change in the number of
available keys with fixed topology, could affect the connectivity vs security trade-off. For such
purpose, three configurations were used (see table 3.4). The experiments were run using one class
0 node (i.e. bridge node) with five adjacent class 1 nodes (e.g. Wi-Fi, Zigbee, Bluetooth).
Table 3.4: Configurations for First Experiment
Keypool Size Keys in class 1 Keys in class 2
100 50 25
200 50 25
100 50 10
Figure 3.7 shows the relation of connectivity vs the minimum number of required keys. As ex-
pected, connectivity drops with the increase of Kmin; however, the starting point of this decent
depends upon the configuration.
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Figure 3.7: Effect of different configurations on connectivity and Kmin
Among the 3 configurations, configuration 1 turned out to be the best. Thus, as the configuration changes the value of
Kmin can be increased, without causing a connectivity drop.
The second part of the experiment dealt with scaling the key management model; hence, the num-
ber of classes was increased gradually. The topology remained the same; that is, a class 0 node was
surrounded by five nodes of each other class. Table 3.5 shows the case where more technologies
are present. Depending on how many technologies are needed within ESORA to solve the domain,
and how sensitive is the data being processed, users may select the proper configuration for the
network, while achieving the desired connectivity.
Table 3.5: Key Distribution Performance
Pconn Kmin S K0 K1 K2 K3
1 0 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
0.9 15 100 50 25 N/A N/A
0.95 10 100 50 25 20 N/A
0.9 20 100 30 25 20 10
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Conclusions
In this chapter we design a secure service-oriented routing algorithm by extending the functional-
ities of SORA [3]. SORA can act as a unifying routing scheme to provide services in a HWMN.
Three techniques were implemented: a key management scheme from HWSN, key shifting, and
node relation monitoring. These techniques targeted providing confidential and reliable multi-hop
path links.
With the implementation of ESORA, it becomes possible to deploy scalable and manageable
HWMN, focusing in providing more content to clients. This approach leaves questions to be
answered: how to provide error free environments, traffic control, and quality of service. We plan
on following our research with error control and recovery scheme for ESORA.
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CHAPTER 4: SECURING DISTRIBUTED SERVER ENDPOINTS
In previous chapters, we have discussed service provisioning from a network layer perspective.
Security concerns were addressed such that a resilient backbone could be provided. This chapter
addresses securing the endpoints of the provided services, i.e., the servers.
For the remainder of the chapter we shall talk about the proposed security model. Such a model re-
lies on machine learning and statistical features, which may applied to any kind of service endpoint
[27]. The model employs expiring token authorization to ease access to services, while keeping
the service endpoints secure, as any token can be revoked if a client is detected to be compromised.
Before a token is revoked the proposed model checks the authenticity of clients via question-like
challenges which use user context information to be formulated.
In particular we cover in this chapter the use of web services due to their extensive presence in cyber
space; however, the model can be use on any service type. Single Page Applications (SPA) and
its benefits are presented afterwards as a foundation to our scheme. We then expose the security
challenges that a SPA may have and how we address them. The later sections of the chapter
describe the experiment we have used to test the feasibility of our approach, and the results that we
have obtained respectively. Finally, the chapter is closed with some remarks and future directions
for this research.
Web Services
Web services have come a long way since their first establishment. So far, the client-server archi-
tecture has proven to be successful in providing services. The popular paradigm of Client/Server
web services has opened endless possibilities where information can be accessed from anywhere.
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However, the traditional Client/Server paradigm demands strong servers specially under high de-
mand systems. Such need open the server to possible denial of service attacks which may results in
an extreme amount of losses depending on how much time a system’s availability is affected. This
scenario can be even more common on large enterprises, where the expected number of requests
in seconds can be around thousands.
To address the demand needs, we propose a different approach to web services, a Single Page Ap-
plication (SPA), with the goal of service provision. SPA technology relies more on the clients, pro-
viding each of them with all the resources they need to run the application, along with a JavaScript
file that acts as a manual to tell clients how to run the application. With SPA technology, the server’s
load can be leveraged and distributed across its multiple clients; thus, increasing availability and
resilience of the system as a whole.
However, such an approach demands a well designed security, given that to increase availability,
the other two fundamental security principles (i.e., integrity and confidentiality) can be greatly
sacrificed; this fact is primarily because the complete Application Programming Interface (API)
is exposed to the client. For such a reason, a trust framework is built around REST services to
achieve both signature and encryption, such that a system can have all main aspects from security.
The following sections cover the concepts of Single Page Applications and security measures em-
ployed with the proposed model.
Single Page Application
This section presents the paradigm under study. Traditionally web services have been delivered
using the Client and Server model. Such a model consists of a client who queries for web pages
from a server, typically using the HTTP protocol or equivalent. Under this traditional paradigm,
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the server is responsible for everything; meanwhile (see Fig. 4.1), the client side only sees the
processed information. Such responsibilities on the server side take time and resources, which
may be leveraged to the client side in order to support higher service loads.
Figure 4.1: Traditional Client/Server Service Model
The black lines represent the navigation interaction of the user. As the user wishes to navigate the application, the
server needs to send the different requested pages. Red arrows represent connections to obtain or modify data.
Alternatively, the Single Page Application paradigm relies more on the processing power which
resides at the client side. Relying more on the client leaves the server with the sole responsibility
of providing the service data. Moreover, the server can tolerate higher amount of clients as it does
not need to handle non-server tasks (see Fig. 4.2). [28] describes SPA as: ”composed of individual
components which can be updated/replaced independently”
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Figure 4.2: Single Page Application Service Model
The initial black line represents the query to obtain the index page, which the server replies with the complete
application, and javascript, which acts as a manual. Subsequent red lines are the queries to obtain or modify data.
Since the applicaton already has all required resources (aside from the services) loaded, then users can navigate
through it as it was an offline application. Server concentrates more on providing content that will be shown on the
application.
SPAs are convenient in terms of performance; however, when it comes to security, servers com-
municating with SPA need to be able to trust that the integrity of the application has not been
compromised, and that its users are kept legitimate at all times. In the next section we elaborate on
security measures appropriate for SPA, considering trust and privacy.
Security in a SPA
Security in Single Page Applications have to rely a lot on trust, as the client side is assigned with
the application’s API and free access to its services. This section covers approaches that, when
combined, can provide a secure environment to SPA, such that it may be adapted to any scenario.
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There has been successful attempts to provide a single sign on functionality, for web applications
in the past, in particular for traditional client/server paradigm [29], and mobile devices [30].
First we adapt OAuth as a back service to our approach (subsection 4), taking advantage of its
expiring tokens. When correct credentials are given to the OAuth provider, our service stores
these credentials encrypted and distributed to use them in the future, when OAuth token is expired
(subsection 4 . Upon token expiration, we check the legitimacy of the user by asking personalized
reCaptchas, which are generated from user questions (subsection 4), these questions allows us to
verify the user is still the same in the event that a malicious user gains access to the user credentials.
Finally, our server gathers periodical anonymous and non-personal data from the usage of the
SPAs, such that it can identify intruder behaviors and present the personalized reCaptcha before
token expiration, upon suspicious user activity (subsection 4).
In the following subsections, we go into detail on how these separate components are implemented.
OAuth
OAuth is, according to the website [31]: ”An open protocol to allow secure authorization in a sim-
ple and standard method from web, mobile and desktop applications.” Simply put, OAuth provides
tokens to applications so that they can act on behalf of users (see Fig. 4.3), without the need for
their credentials. Moreover, OAuth allows for selective access of information for each token; i.e.,
one application may receive a token with certain rights, while another application may get another
token with less rights. These tokens can also expire after a certain amount of time. OAuth is not
the only type of token revocation system, in [32] a game model revocation system got proposed,
which served in part as inspiration for enhancing OAuth. OAuth is still poses the advantage that it
has many service providers.
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OAuth
Provider
Figure 4.3: OAuth Authentication Model
OAuth’s handshake is established by providing the user credentials to OAuth provider. Once the credentials are
provided, a token is genereated and sent to the application that required authentication. Further authorization needs
use the token in place of the user credentials.
At first glance, it may look as OAuth is the ultimate solution to solve the security requirements
in SPAs. However, a malicious user can potentially gain access to the OAuth token, and thus,
pose to be a legitimate user. [33] and [34] identified several attacks and medium which may be
used for such attacks. Some of the attacks included token eavesdropping, token theft via XSS,
impersonation, session swapping, and force login.
This is a problem exhibited in any web application, but it becomes larger when dealing with SPA
as the whole application resides on the client side. OAuth tokens, still provide effective access con-
trol, for which part of our solution incorporates OAuth. Specifically, we chose OAuth 2.0; although
it does not force SSL certificates at the client side it does have the token expiration feature which
is a key component for this work. OAuth’s functionality is enhanced by taking advantage of its ex-
piring tokens, with secure and distributed storage of users credentials, and generated personalized
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reCaptchas.
Distributed Secure Credentials
In this subsection, we elaborate the design of securely and distributed storing the credentials of our
clients inside of some nodes. Like in [35], the idea is distribute optimally the information, in this
case the credentials, such that we can securely authorize the execution of API calls. This can by
achieved by renewing expired tokens without the need to prompt the user credentials, as these or
the application itself may have been compromised.
OAuth
Provider
1. normal user
2. use expire token
3. blocked access4. personal reCaptcha
5. correct answer
6. gatter and assemble 
password pieces
6. gatter and assemble 
password pieces
7. re-authenticate
8. fresh token
Figure 4.4: Token Renewal Process
This process is carried out when a token expired or if suspicious activity by a user is detected. The goal is to verify
user’s identity without the need for credentials.
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The renewal process is shown in Fig. 4.4. The approach taken is to encrypt the password and
distribute it across the content network nodes. For the secure distribution needed for step 6 we do
the following:
1. Get the plain text password from the user
2. Mix the plain text password with known random characters at known locations to make the
password of fixed length (e.g., 256 characters)
3. Encrypt the fixed length password created in the previous step
4. Slice the encrypted password into equal length segments
5. Distribute each segment to the content nodes
6. Nodes reply with a value which will be used to query later for the individual pieces of the
password when decryption is needed
This approach achieves that no single node on the network knows anything about the password,
aside from the central node, which only knows where the encrypted parts are stored. If either of
the nodes gets compromised the only information that is seen is just part of an encrypted password.
If the central node gets compromised, then only the location of the distributed password would be
known, but schemes like the ones done in [36] for networks where service nodes join and leave,
can be used to stop trusting this central node. However, no credentials can be found by just taking
control of one node.
The next subsection discusses the personalized reCaptcha generation.
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Trusting the Anonymous
In this subsection, we discuss the proposed scheme to trust the client apps. Such procedure must
be done anonymously in order to preserve the client side privacy. The approach taken is from an
application perspective; such an approach may be combined with network layer anonymous trust
as shown in [37].
From the server’s perspective, the goal is to ensure that the user is kept as the same across the
token’s lifetime. The reCaptcha technology has been created to test for human users; however it
cannot test for legitimacy of the user.
Upon joining the app, we ask the user for questions that can generate personal reCaptchas (see Fig.
4.5). Such reCaptchas may be generated in a systematic manner, or using more natural approaches
as the one proposed in [38]. Later, the OAuth token expiration feature can be used to periodi-
cally check if the user is still the same. Fig. 4.5 shows an example of a personalized reCaptcha,
which includes preferences information to ask questions. These questions are easy to answer, but
require knowledge that only the original user has. In this manner, we can re-authenticate the user,
without having to ask for the credentials. Upon successful re-authentication we can use OAuth to
regenerate the expired token. In order for the token renewal to work, we need to store the orig-
inal credentials securely, so we can exchange it with the OAuth provider. We can securely store
the credentials as discussed in the previous subsection. Therefore, a user’s information contains
(username, personalized data, password nodes).
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Figure 4.5: Personalized reCaptcha using movie posters
From user preferences many questions can be asked, the collection is only one of endless. Without knowing the
context, we cannot be sure which the correct answer is. Possible questions, all with different answers: Which of these
movies does contain not your favorite actor/actress? (Answer could be Vin Diesel) Which is not in your favorite
movie type? (Answer could be Super Hero or Action movies) These would be generated if the user prefers a movie
type or actor; therefore, user preference information is needed.
Using the proposed anonymous trust framework, we are able to include a personalized authenti-
cation method. The framework achieves enhancement of traditional password (something that the
user knows) authentication, to include answers from user preferences, therefore adding personality
(something that the user is) to the authentication method. Such enhancement can also be used to
secure the password across the content network, such that we may use it to renew OAuth tokens
when needed.
The following subsection introduces the final component of our proposed system, a centralized
integrity checker server to detect compromised applications.
56
Periodical Integrity Checking
Having an application running on the client’s browser completely means that the application’s
integrity may be compromised without much effort, using even tools that come packaged with the
browser by default. Unfortunately, there is no way that this can be prevented in the event of a
malicious user gaining access to our application. Such is not the case on traditional client/server
applications, as other have shown that one can stop cross-site scripting with high effectiveness
[39]. What we can do is detect when suspicious activity is taking place and block malicious users
from accessing or modifying our content.
The SPA can check its integrity and report it periodically to the content server by sending non-
personal information. Such information may include: a hash of the source code, the length in
bytes of the source code, and last modified/last activity time stamps. Server can detect anomalies,
by comparing against all running clients behavior. Anomalies (i.e., suspicious activity) is detected
when the behavior is an outlier of the statistics for normal users. Statistical data may be combined
with deep packet analysis for better results leading to protection against complex malware such as
botnets [40].
When suspicious applications are detected, instead of blocking the application immediately, the
personalized reCaptcha is sent to the application, such that the current user can be re-authenticated.
Experimental Setup
This section discusses the experimental setup established to implement and test the proposed ap-
proach.
For illustration purposes, we created a small HTML service on Java , using Spring MVC, which
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is on of the leading technologies for traditional client/server applications. We compared that im-
plementation with the SPA equivalent, by increasing the number of simultaneous requests, using
JMeter.
For the SPA implementation, the technology composing the MEAN stack has been employed
(MongoDB, ExpressJS, AngularJS, and NodeJS). The client side is based on the AngularJS frame-
work, which allows for HTTP interceptors where we can place our integrity checker service, which
reads the file stats and content located in the route.templateUrl JSON.
The server side is written in NodeJS, and contains REST endpoints which are supported by the
ExpressJS framework. We have simulated the different content nodes for distributed secure cre-
dentials using different port numbers on each instance.
The stability of the system as a whole has been tested using a fuzzer that is available under Node’s
NPM manager. The fuzzer module outputs a 500 code when the server crashes, which leads to a
vulnerability. The fuzzer module can also be used to put random string into the source code of the
angular SPA. Lastly, a script has been created to simulate attacks onto the SPA, both source code
modification as well as feeding malicious inputs.
Results and Discussion
The purpose of the first part of the experiment, has been to test if a SPA is indeed beneficial as a
load distributions system. Using only the simple HTML server, we have obtained Figs. 4.6 to 4.8.
On these figures we can appreciate that SPAs provide a more stable response time as the number of
simultaneous request increases. This in some sense may reflect a natural robustness against naive
Denial of Service attacks, as the load is leverage from the server and more responsibility falls under
the client side.
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Figure 4.6: SPA vs Client Server Response Time Comparison
SPA’s response time take longer to rise because they are more latency oriented. Heavy CPU dependent applications
would still take more advantage of the traditional implementations, as Javascript is best for IO operation, not so much
for CPU operations.
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Figure 4.7: SPA vs Client Server Response Time Stability
SPAs have a smaller standard deviation as the number of requests increases. This means that the average response
time will be close for all requests. Traditional applications on the other hand, when the volume increases, will have
requests that take less time, some may take more time, and other may never be completed.
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Figure 4.8: SPA vs Client Server Error Rates
For both types of applications, the error rate is practically none under low traffic. However, as traffic increases we see
that the error rate is comparably smaller in SPA, this leads to less chances of crashing because of high load. Thus,
stronger against Denil of Service attacks.
Now that we have seen that SPAs provide a performance advantage, the next experiment demon-
strates how our proposed approach can secure the application across its life cycle. First, Fig. 4.9
shows how a simple password such as ”test1234” could be fragmented into 8 groups, each scattered
across different nodes in the network. As seen in the figure, using AES128 and the randomized
characters, the plain text password increase in size drastically; thus, combining the new size and
the distribution of the password, there is no apparent correlation between the cipher and plain text
password.
61
Figure 4.9: Distributed Password Encryption
Example of password generation for plain text ”test1234”. Each group is generated from an 8 character (real +
randomized) password data. Result is 8 encrypted subpasswords which get distributed across the ndoes.
Fig. 4.10 shows how the server is able to detect when the application source code is changed, with
the goal of disguising a malicious attempt as legitimate These types of modifications have been
detected with a 100% accuracy.
Figure 4.10: Compromised Integrity Detection
In the event of source code modification, the server can detect such modification with no effort required.
Finally, Fig. 4.11 shows the success when trying to detect suspicious activity. As seen in the
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figure, the server does manage to detect this type of attack, which normally will be in the form
of the malicious inputs. The server detected this type of attack with a 95% accuracy. The type of
features used for detecting this kind of modification only included the size of the $scope variable
contents in bytes, which may promise better results if some other feature is used in combination
(e.g., modification time interval).
Figure 4.11: Suspicious Acitivity Detection
Suspicious acitivity, or otherwise known as malicious modification to the input data, can also be detected with very
high accuracy (95%).
The next section closes this chapter with some remarks and future work on the SPA security and
performance)
Conclusion
This chapter proposes different approaches for security in SPA. When combined, each of these
approaches have obtained a trust environment, where compromised applications can be detected,
such that action may be taken upon it.
The personalized reCaptchas have shown to establish an easy credentials-free way to re-authenticate
the user. When we combined this with the distributed credentials, we obtained a system that can
take advantage of OAuth technology, while still using periodical authentication to ensure legiti-
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macy of the user. Furthermore, having the password encrypted and sliced across different content
nodes, gives resilience to the event that one of the nodes is compromised; under such an event,
only one encrypted portion of the password would be known. By monitoring each other, nodes
can detect compromised nodes, and thus, invalidate (i.e., require personalized reCaptcha) all users
who have pieces of the password stored at the compromised machine.
Overall, the proposed framework has shown security across the multiple stages that the application
could encounter, as well as performance improvements.
As future direction, we plan to look at the social engineering and how it may be used to enforce
or crack this type of security, on SPA. This in time can help to establish more robust systems. We
also plan to look at how this system performs against all the types of attacks shown in [33] and
[34]. Finally, we will include an analysis of the CPU requirements and any stress test on the server
side to see how much impact the security check has on the server side CPU.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
Conclusions
In this thesis, we evaluated pervasive content provision by constructing HWMN networks to
achieve the IoT. HMWN provide means to achieve COTS solutions, which exploit the throughput,
coverage, and delay of content provisioning. Furthermore, in this work we concentrated on es-
tablishing mechanisms for secure connections in such heterogeneous networks. With secure links
HWMN can alleviate content provisioning on the server side, by incorporating client nodes as the
content processing unit. Letting the client process its own content allows servers to concentrate
more on providing the back-end services.
Less load on the servers imply more support for incoming connections as well as resilience to ma-
licious or changing environments. To prevent malicious users from using the backbone, the servers
can afford to employ advance security defenses such as distributed intrusion detection, as they are
not processing content, only delivering content. The content network can adapt to changing envi-
ronments, for example temporary server failure, since the clients processing the content can cache
such content within their SPA, and retry uploading at a later time. SPAs also gave real time updates
on content so that everyone learn of changes in content. This in turn allows for clients to become
temporary service providers, as they can process the content and re-deliver it to adjacent networks.
Future Work
Secure HWMNs combined with a SPA front end showed promising results and possibilities. Now
we must exploit the HWMN nature to provide content and services into different domains. To
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achieve such goal, one can explore how Artificial Intelligence and Parallel Computing can help
optimizing the HWMN. As future projects to follow this thesis we can mention to formulate a
mechanism to optimally deploy HWMNs, maximizing performance and security, while minimiz-
ing delays, power, and costs. Once an optimal configuration has been deploy, it would mandate
to have an adaptive mechanism so the network can react to dynamic environments, providing fault
tolerance with maximize performance. Finally, one can take advantage of the distributed nature of
HWMN, to process content in parallel, optimizing resources and providing fault tolerance, as well
as error detection and correction.
66
APPENDIX : BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
67
Hector M Lugo-Cordero was born in July 15 of 1983 at the city of San Juan, Puerto Rico. Hector
is the son of Hector M Lugo-Santiago and Diana Cordero-Arias. He has a younger brother names
Luis A. Lugo-Cordero and a younger sister named Liz Y. Lugo-Cordero.
On April 2006 Hector passed the Fundamentals of Engineering exam and then on October 2006 he
passed the Principles and Practice of Engineering Exam.
In June of 2006 he received the tittle of Bachelor in Science in Computer Engineering with Magna
Cum Laude (high honors) from the University of Puerto Rico Mayaguu¨ez Campus. He then con-
tinued his studies on August 2006 at the University of Puerto Rico Mayaguu¨ez Campus in the
area of Computer Engineering with a specialty in Computer Networks under the supervision of Dr.
Kejie Lu, from which he earned the tittle of Master in Science in Computer Engineering in June
2009.
Later he became a PhD candidate at the University of Central Florida under the advisement of Dr.
Ratan K. Guha, once more concentrating in Computer Engineering in August 2009. He also de-
cided in January 2012 to pursue a dual degree, pursing a Masters in Science in Computer Science.
After several internships at Disney, he became a Cast Member inMay 2015 under the team of Level
2. Here he had the opportunity to present several projects to the company in the areas of application
development, databases, data warehouse, productivity enhancement, and service availability.
His research interests include software development, computer networks, artificial intelligence,
and green energy applications.
68
LIST OF REFERENCES
[1] I.F. Akyildiz and Xudong Wang. A survey on wireless mesh networks. Communications
Magazine, IEEE, 43:S23–S30, 2005.
[2] X. Larrucea, G. Benguria, and S. Schuster. Mdsoa for achieving interoperability. IEEE
ICCBSS 2007, 2007.
[3] H.M. Lugo-Cordero, Kejie Lu, D. Rodriguez, and S. Kota. A novel service-oriented rout-
ing algorithm for wireless mesh network. In Military Communications Conference, 2008.
MILCOM 2008. IEEE, pages 1–6, 2008.
[4] A. Roy, S.K. Das, and K. Basu. A predictive framework for Location-Aware resource man-
agement in smart homes. Mobile Computing, IEEE Transactions on, 6(11):1270–1283, 2007.
[5] D. Rodriguez, K. Lu, and C. Aceros. Sirlab-netsig integration for environmental surveillance
monitoring in wireless mesh sensor networks. In Circuits and Systems (LASCAS), 2011 IEEE
Second Latin American Symposium on, pages 1–4, Feb. 2011.
[6] Hector M Lugo-Cordero. Wireless mesh networks: Service oriented design and channel
optimization. Master’s thesis, University of Puerto Rico at Mayaguez, 11 2008.
[7] Kejie Lu, Yi Qian, and Hsiao-Hwa Chen. Wireless broadband access: Wimax and beyond -
a secure and service-oriented network control framework for wimax networks. Communica-
tions Magazine, IEEE, 45(5):124 –130, may 2007.
[8] M. Mamei and F. Zambonelli. Programming pervasive and mobile computing applications:
The tota approach. ACM Transactions on Software Engineering and Methodology, 18(4),
2009.
69
[9] V. Ricquebourg, D. Menga, B. Marhic, L. Delahoche, D. Durand, and C. Loge. Service
oriented architecture for context perception based on heterogeneous sensors network. In
IEEE Industrial Electronics, IECON 2006 - 32nd Annual Conference on, pages 4557–4562,
2006.
[10] J.M. Reyes Alamo and J. Wong. Service-oriented middleware for smart home applications.
In Wireless Hive Networks Conference, 2008. WHNC 2008. IEEE, pages 1–4, 2008.
[11] Chun-Yu Chen, Yu-Ping Tsoul, Shu-Chen Liao, and Cheng-Ting Lin. Implementing the
design of smart home and achieving energy conservation. In Industrial Informatics, 2009.
INDIN 2009. 7th IEEE International Conference on, pages 273–276, 2009.
[12] Tinghuai Ma, Yong-Deak Kim, Qiang Ma, Meili Tang, and Weican Zhou. Context-aware im-
plementation based on CBR for smart home. InWireless And Mobile Computing, Networking
And Communications, 2005. (WiMob’2005), IEEE International Conference on, volume 4,
pages 112–115 Vol. 4, 2005.
[13] H.M. Lugo-Cordero, R.K. Guha, and Kejie Lu. A secure service-oriented routing algo-
rithm for heterogeneous wireless mesh networks. In Global Telecommunications Conference
(GLOBECOM 2011), 2011 IEEE, pages 1–5, Dec 2011.
[14] Hector M. Lugo-Cordero, Ratan K. Guha, Kejie Lu, and Domingo Rodriguez. Secure service
distribution for versatile service-oriented wireless mesh networks. 2013 8th International
Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software: ”The Americas” (MALWARE), 0:88–94,
2011.
[15] Jie Lin, Yunliang Zhang, Zhiyong Tan, and Yiqi Dai. A novel secure distributed disk system.
In Advanced Communication Technology, 2009. ICACT 2009. 11th International Conference
on, volume 02, pages 1476 –1481, feb. 2009.
70
[16] T. Werner, C. Fuchs, E. Gerhards-Padilla, and P. Martini. Nebula - generating syntactical
network intrusion signatures. In Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE), 2009 4th
International Conference on, pages 31 –38, oct. 2009.
[17] Ronghua Tian, R. Islam, L. Batten, and S. Versteeg. Differentiating malware from cleanware
using behavioural analysis. In Malicious and Unwanted Software (MALWARE), 2010 5th
International Conference on, pages 23 –30, oct. 2010.
[18] T.C. Chieu, Thao Nguyen, and Liangzhao Zeng. Secure search of private documents in an
enterprise content management system. In e-Business Engineering, 2007. ICEBE 2007. IEEE
International Conference on, pages 105 –112, oct. 2007.
[19] Yong Zhang, Wei-Xin Li, and Xia-Mu Niu. Secure cipher index over encrypted character
data in database. In Machine Learning and Cybernetics, 2008 International Conference on,
volume 2, pages 1111 –1116, july 2008.
[20] A. Singh, M. Srivatsa, and Ling Liu. Efficient and secure search of enterprise file systems.
In Web Services, 2007. ICWS 2007. IEEE International Conference on, pages 18 –25, july
2007.
[21] Abdelkader H. Ouda, David S. Allison, and Miriam A. M. Capretz. Security protocols in
service-oriented architecture. In Proceedings of the 2010 6th World Congress on Services,
SERVICES ’10, pages 185–186, Washington, DC, USA, 2010. IEEE Computer Society.
[22] Yi Qian, Kejie Lu, Bo Rong, Hector Lugo, and David Tipper. An optimal key management
scheme for wireless sensor networks. In Military Communications Conference, 2007. MIL-
COM 2007. IEEE, pages 1 –6, oct. 2007.
[23] David Wheeler and Roger Needham. Tea, a tiny encryption algorithm. pages 97–110.
Springer-Verlag, 1995.
71
[24] Daniel J. Bernstein. Cache-timing attacks on aes. Technical report, 2005.
[25] Xiaodong Lin. Cat: Building couples to early detect node compromise attack in wireless sen-
sor networks. In Global Telecommunications Conference, 2009. GLOBECOM 2009. IEEE,
pages 1 –6, 30 2009-dec. 4 2009.
[26] J. Kennedy and R. Eberhart. Particle swarm optimization. volume 4, pages 1942–1948, nov.
1995.
[27] H.M. Lugo-Cordero and R.K. Guha. A secured distribution of server loads to clients. In
Military Communications Conference, 2015. MILCOM 2015. IEEE, Oct 2015.
[28] A. Mesbah and A. van Deursen. Migrating multi-page web applications to single-page ajax
interfaces. In Software Maintenance and Reengineering, 2007. CSMR ’07. 11th European
Conference on, pages 181–190, March 2007.
[29] M. Hillenbrand, J. Gotze, J. Muller, and P. Muller. A single sign-on framework for web-
services-based distributed applications. In Telecommunications, 2005. ConTEL 2005. Pro-
ceedings of the 8th International Conference on, volume 1, pages 273–279, June 2005.
[30] Gianluigi Me, D. Pirro, and R. Sarrecchia. A mobile based approach to strong authentication
on web. In Computing in the Global Information Technology, 2006. ICCGI ’06. International
Multi-Conference on, pages 67–67, Aug 2006.
[31] OAuth community site. http://oauth.net. Accessed: 2015-05-04.
[32] M. Jebalia, A. Ben Letaifa, M. Hamdi, and S. Tabbane. A revocation game model for se-
cure cloud storage. In High Performance Computing Simulation (HPCS), 2014 International
Conference on, pages 1016–1017, July 2014.
[33] Sun San-Tsai. Simple but not secure: An empirical security analysis of oauth 2.0-based single
sign-on systems. In Proceedings of the ACL 2012 System Demonstrations.
72
[34] Sun San-Tsai and Konstantin Beznosov. The devil is in the (implementation) details: An
empirical analysis of oauth sso systems. In Proceedings of the 2012 ACM conference on
Computer and communications security, pages 378–390. ACM, 2012.
[35] Yulai Xie, K.-K. Muniswamy-Reddy, Dan Feng, D.D.E. Long, Y. Kang, Zhongying Niu, and
Zhipeng Tan. Design and evaluation of oasis: An active storage framework based on t10 osd
standard. In Mass Storage Systems and Technologies (MSST), 2011 IEEE 27th Symposium
on, pages 1–12, May 2011.
[36] S. Abedinzadeh and S. Sadaoui. Agent trust management based on human plausible reason-
ing: Application to web search. In Privacy, Security, Risk and Trust (PASSAT), 2012 Interna-
tional Conference on and 2012 International Confernece on Social Computing (SocialCom),
pages 760–765, Sept 2012.
[37] A. Matos, S. Sargento, and Rui L. Aguiar. Waypoint routing: A network layer privacy frame-
work. In Global Telecommunications Conference (GLOBECOM 2011), 2011 IEEE, pages
1–6, Dec 2011.
[38] Rafael E. Banchs and Haizhou Li. Iris: A chat-oriented dialogue system based on the vector
space model. In Proceedings of the ACL 2012 System Demonstrations, ACL ’12, pages 37–
42, Stroudsburg, PA, USA, 2012. Association for Computational Linguistics.
[39] J. Shanmugam and M. Ponnavaikko. A solution to block cross site scripting vulnerabilities
based on service oriented architecture. In Computer and Information Science, 2007. ICIS
2007. 6th IEEE/ACIS International Conference on, pages 861–866, July 2007.
[40] D. Smallwood and A. Vance. Intrusion analysis with deep packet inspection: Increasing
efficiency of packet based investigations. In Cloud and Service Computing (CSC), 2011
International Conference on, pages 342–347, Dec 2011.
73
